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Partner Selection in R&D Collaborations:  
Effects of Affiliations with Venture Capitalists 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper extends information economics to the literature on alliance partner selection by 
demonstrating how VCs can facilitate R&D collaborations. We investigate a new role for VCs – 
information intermediation – that can enable R&D partnerships between entrepreneurial ventures 
that lack knowledge of each other’s technological resources.  In contrast to the more diffuse 
signaling benefits entrepreneurial ventures obtain by affiliating with prominent VCs, backing by 
a common VC can privately and directly reduce information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurial ventures.  We demonstrate that the effects of VC information intermediation are 
more pronounced when prospective collaborators are at the earliest stages of product 
development and when they find it difficult to judge each other’s technological resources, such 
as when they do not have previous partnerships together, do not draw upon each other’s 
knowledge bases, and have dissimilar technology portfolios. We empirically investigate the 
multiple different ways in which VCs potentially facilitate R&D partner selection and identify 
specific conditions under which VCs’ information intermediation function contributes to 
segmentation in markets for R&D alliances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Partner selection has been regarded as one of the most important choices firms make 
regarding their collaborative strategies (e.g., Geringer, 1991; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Luo, 
1997; Hitt et al., 2004; Ring et al., 2005; Shah and Swaminathan, 2008; Beamish and Lupton, 
2009; Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010).  Specifically, these decisions can have an impact on 
the technological and other resources that firms access through collaborative agreements (e.g., 
Hagedoorn, 2002), and they are particularly important for R&D alliances involving 
entrepreneurial ventures in high-tech industries (e.g., Deeds and Hill, 1996; Rothaermel and 
Boeker, 2008). While R&D collaborations can play a significant role in enabling competitive 
advantage for entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hagedoorn, 
2002; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), the extent to which such ventures can benefit from R&D 
collaborations is expected to vary depending on the partners they select (e.g., Rothaermel and 
Boeker, 2008; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012).  
Although the extant literature suggests that firms should make partner selection decisions 
based upon the technological and other resources possessed by prospective collaborators, 
entrepreneurial ventures in high-tech industries can also face serious challenges understanding 
and evaluating the resources of others in the first place.  Firms perform costly activities searching 
for and evaluating partners’ intangible resources (e.g., Geertz, 1978; Stuart, 1998; Rangan, 2000; 
Vanhaverberke, Duysters, and Noorderhaven, 2002; Villalonga and McGahan, 2004). 
Prospective collaborators may avoid disclosure of proprietary information (e.g., Arrow, 1962, 
Teece, 1996; Dushnitsky and Shaver, 2009), and have incentives to overstate the quality of their 
R&D resources in order to obtain a partnership (e.g., Gulati, 1999; Nicholson et al., 2005). As a 
consequence, due diligence activities for evaluating a potential partner’s intangible resources can 
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be ineffective and inefficient (e.g., Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Chi, 1994). Such problems 
magnify when prospective partners lack knowledge of each other’s technological resources and 
their commercial prospects (Akerlof, 1970; Stuart, 1998; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005).  Absent 
remedies to these problems, markets for alliance partners can fail, and partners can forego 
valuable collaborative partnerships (Li et al., 2008).  Moreover, many of the ways in which firms 
can overcome these hurdles, including building knowledge resources or relying on prior ties, can 
take time and are therefore difficult to employ for entrepreneurial ventures at early stages of 
development. 
However, such ventures can rely upon a credible information intermediary who has 
detailed knowledge about both partners’ resources and activities. In particular, venture capitalists 
(VCs) can function as credible third-parties who reduce information asymmetries between 
prospective partners (Lindsey, 2008). VCs specialize in appraising entrepreneurial ventures in 
high-tech industries before committing capital (e.g., Amit et al., 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 
2001), and they accumulate substantial information on ventures as they monitor their progress 
and offer value-added services to them (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Aoki, 2000; Busenitz 
et al., 2004; Gans and Stern, 2003).  As a consequence, VCs can potentially have an impact on 
R&D partner selection by functioning as information intermediaries between prospective 
partners. In particular, VCs can provide important information about a firm’s technological and 
other resources, ideas, plans, and market prospects to other companies in their portfolios, so they 
can directly reduce information asymmetries between prospective partners and facilitate alliances 
among their portfolio companies (Lindsey, 2008). Inasmuch as VCs can reduce information 
asymmetries in this manner, we suggest that the degree to which they facilitate collaborations 
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will depend upon firms’ lack of knowledge about each other’s technological resources and 
prospects. 
In this paper, we therefore aim to advance research on alliance partner selection by 
investigating a new role of VCs -- information intermediation -- in shaping R&D partner 
selection for entrepreneurial ventures. More specifically, we investigate two main research 
questions:  First, to what extent are entrepreneurial ventures in a high-tech industry likely to 
select prospective partners that are backed by a common VC investor?  Second, to what extent 
does the positive effect of having a common VC vary based upon prospective partners’ lack of 
knowledge of each other’s technological resources and prospects?   
Venture capitalists might influence the R&D partnerships of startups in many other ways 
since VCs affect portfolio companies’ strategies, offer endorsements on their quality to exchange 
partners, provide expertise and other value-added services to ventures, and exert influence by 
virtue of their ownership (e.g., Sapienza, 1992; Lerner, 1995; Hellman and Puri, 2000; Hsu, 
2006). This makes it interesting to examine the ways in which such third-party intermediaries 
might have an influence on the R&D collaborations undertaken by high-tech startups.  Rich 
information available on firms’ technological resources and activities as well as involvement by 
VCs enable empirical analysis of these and other potential explanations for why firms with 
common VCs are more likely to partner with one another (e.g., homophily, super-additivity of 
technological resources, etc.).  Moreover, the contingencies we investigate related to the 
development of new ventures and their familiarity with each other’s technological resources also 
enable us to unpack the influences that VCs have on R&D partner selection and to help isolate 
the information intermediation role that VCs can fulfill. 
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Beyond investigating this value-added role of venture capitalists and extending 
information economics to the literature on partner selection, we show that investigating VCs in 
the alliance context can inform the partner selection literature more broadly in three ways (e.g., 
Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Luo, 1997; Hitt et al., 2004; Ring et al., 2005; Rothaermel and 
Boeker, 2008; Shah and Swaminathan, 2008; Beamish and Lupton, 2009; Diestre and 
Rajagopalan, 2012).  First, existing research highlights the signaling role of affiliations with VCs 
in shaping firms’ opportunities for transactions (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Reuer and Ragozzino, 2012, 
2014; Reuer, Tong, and Wu, 2012; Ozmel et al., 2013), yet we suggest that VCs can facilitate 
R&D alliances between individual prospective partners that lack first-hand knowledge about 
each other’s technological resources.  Signals can be an important means of coping with 
information asymmetries surrounding firms, and signals are available to all prospective exchange 
partners.  By contrast, the information intermediated by VCs between two particular companies 
privately and directly reduces their information asymmetries, thereby confers potential 
information advantages, and can help explain who partners with whom and under what 
conditions.   
Second, research on R&D partner selection more generally emphasizes the importance of 
prospective partners’ technological resources as a basis of fit between them (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; 
Gans and Stern, 2003; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008).  We would suggest, however, that 
partners routinely encounter difficulties judging partners’ technological and other resources in 
the first place.  Venture capitalists can help relieve such problems, enabling entrepreneurial 
ventures to engage in collaborations at the earliest stages of development and in less familiar 
technological domains.   
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Third, in advancing understanding of the ways in which common VCs can facilitate R&D 
partnerships by startups, we complement research that has focused on other ties or intermediaries 
(e.g., investment banks) employed by more established firms to foster economic exchanges 
(Gulati, 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Li et al., 2008; Sleptsov, Anand, and Vasudeva, 
2013).  We build upon and extend this research by demonstrating that the effects of information 
intermediation through VCs are greatest when startups are at the earliest stages of development 
and lack familiarity with each other’s technological resources through prior ties or other means.     
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Background Theory 
R&D alliances are a prominent way in which partners exchange, share, and co-develop 
knowledge and contribute to the commercialization of technologies (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Mowery, 
Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Tallman and Phene, 2007). Firms enter into R&D collaborations 
with exchange partners to utilize their technological capabilities and know-how for new product 
development and commercialization (e.g., Teece, 1996; Hsu, 2006). For example, 
entrepreneurial ventures in the biotechnology industry enter into alliances to enhance their 
technological capabilities and commercialization prospects (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). 
Thus, R&D alliances are important avenues for entrepreneurial ventures to obtain knowledge and 
access new technological resources to foster their development (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, 
Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006). 
While considerable research emphasizes that firms select partners based upon their 
resources and capabilities (e.g., Geringer, 1991; Mowery et al., 1998; Hitt et al., 2004; Li et al., 
2008; Dekker and Van den Abbeele, 2010; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012), less attention has 
been given to the constraints and challenges firms face during partner selection.  Firms often 
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confront considerable uncertainty concerning a prospective partner’s resources and prospects, 
and they are subject to risks associated with asymmetric information when searching for R&D 
partnerships (e.g., Pisano, 1990). For example, entrepreneurial ventures exhibit short track 
records on their resources and projects (e.g., Shane and Stuart, 2002), just as they lack the 
necessary resources and capabilities to perform due-diligence activities on other partners (e.g., 
Stinchcombe, 1965). While complementary technological and other resources can lead to 
valuable exchanges between alliance partners (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), lack of 
knowledge about prospective partners’ resources can exacerbate problems of appraising 
resources due to information asymmetries. Moreover, given that R&D resources are mostly 
intangible and difficult to evaluate (e.g., Arrow, 1962), R&D alliance partners would have 
incentives to misrepresent the technological and commercialization potential of their resources in 
order to obtain economic exchanges such as R&D partnerships. Under these conditions, markets 
for particular R&D partnerships can fail and become segmented, as we describe below (c.f., 
Milgrom and Stokey, 1982; Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004). 
Given that many firms in high-tech industries are VC backed (e.g., Sahlman, 1990; 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001), entrepreneurial ventures can obtain assistance from their VCs in 
their formation of R&D alliances. For example, it is well known that affiliating with prominent 
VCs can enable a firm to draw in many different investors as well as alliance partners based on 
the endorsement of these VCs (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Hsu, 2006; 
Ragozzino and Reuer, 2007; Ozmel et al., 2013).  Entrepreneurial ventures can also benefit from 
VC backing in a second way:  startups can enter into R&D alliances by searching for potential 
partners within the portfolios of the VCs backing them. VCs have access to idiosyncratic, 
project-specific information and details about the strategy and progress of each of their portfolio 
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firms (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Busenitz et al., 2004). Further, they actively participate 
in value-creating activities of their portfolio firms and wish to maximize the accruable cash flows 
from their investments (e.g., Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006; Jackson et al., 2012). VCs are therefore 
well-positioned to help their portfolio firms obtain opportunities for R&D collaborations (e.g., 
Gans and Stern, 2003).  Thus, firms looking for R&D partners can expect their VCs to channel 
the information they obtain in due diligence and monitoring processes in other firms in the 
portfolio, thereby facilitating firms’ search for potential partners (e.g., Aoki, 2000; Lindsey, 
2008). In this manner, VCs act as information intermediaries for entrepreneurial ventures making 
partner selection decisions and can shape future R&D alliances with certain partners by directly 
reducing information asymmetries.  
In the hypotheses developed below, we examine the information intermediary role of 
VCs in reducing information asymmetries for entrepreneurial ventures about prospective 
collaborators to hypothesize on who partners with whom and how R&D partnerships get built up 
within high-tech industries. A primary implication of asymmetric information between 
prospective alliance partners is that the likelihood of a collaboration between two firms falls with 
the adverse selection risk surrounding a transaction (e.g., Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). In our 
hypotheses we use this core idea to understand the information intermediary role of a common 
VC investor in reducing the information asymmetry between prospective R&D alliance partners.  
If having a common VC is generally valuable in reducing information asymmetries 
between firms (Lindsey, 2008), then we can use information economics as applied in strategy 
and entrepreneurship research to identify particular conditions under which this intermediary role 
of VCs is apt to be particularly valuable based on prospective partners’ lack of first-hand 
knowledge about each other’s technological resources and activities.  To begin with, given that a 
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firm’s stage of development is indicative of the maturity of its R&D resources and their 
commercial potential (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Ahuja, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), 
firms that are in early stages of product development present greater information asymmetries 
and risk of adverse selection to potential partners. We therefore investigate whether sharing a 
common VC investor will have a more pronounced effect when partner firms are yet in early 
stages of product development. Even in such early stages of development, however, prospective 
partners might be more familiar with each other’s technological resources and be capable of 
evaluating partners’ capabilities through other means.  This familiarity of each other’s 
technological resources and their prospects is expected to diminish the potential impact of VC 
information intermediation on alliance partner selection.  In particular, this familiarity and 
resulting ability to appreciate each other’s technological capabilities can be developed by having 
previous alliances with each other (e.g., Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002; Higgins and Rodriguez, 
2006; Zaheer et al., 2010), building upon each other’s knowledge bases during the development 
of technologies (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Mowery et al., 1998), or possessing similar 
technological resource endowments (e.g., Stuart, 1998; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Gilsing et 
al., 2008). We therefore identify particular conditions that capture a prospective alliance’s 
information environment and hence shape the implications of common VC backing for partner 
selection.  As we will discuss, the contingencies we investigate are useful not only in identifying 
the impact of VC information intermediation and relevant boundary conditions highlighted by 
information economics, but they also are useful in considering alternative potential ways in 
which VCs might affect alliance partner selection and the build-up of R&D collaborations in 
industries. 
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Research Hypotheses 
Common VC Investor.  Our primary interest lies in understanding the determinants of 
who partners with whom and under what conditions, in order to contribute to the literature on 
partner selection for R&D collaborations. We begin by considering how VCs can directly reduce 
information asymmetries between potential alliance partners, and we develop a baseline 
hypothesis on how VC information intermediation shapes R&D partner selection.  To begin 
with, entrepreneurial ventures have to allocate scarce resources to search for and evaluate 
potential R&D alliance partners (Stuart, 1998). However, entrepreneurial ventures can rely on 
their VCs to overcome problems related to the selection of potential alliance partners, and this 
assistance allows them to efficiently enter into R&D collaborations with favorable partners (e.g., 
Aoki, 2000; Gans et al., 2002; Lindsey, 2008).  
There are several important foundations to the information intermediation function that 
VCs can fulfill.  To begin with, VCs syndicate their investments and diversify their portfolios by 
investing in entrepreneurial ventures that are at different stages of development (e.g., Lerner, 
1995; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), so they have access to project-specific information and details 
about the strategy and progress of their portfolio of firms (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; 
Gompers, 1995; Busenitz et al., 2004). VCs also obtain an equity position and cash flow rights 
(Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003), as well as extensive contingent control rights in ventures (e.g., 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003). VCs therefore actively participate in value-creating activities of 
their portfolio of firms to increase the value of their investments (e.g., Arthurs and Busenitz, 
2006; Jackson et al., 2012).  These value-added services can include providing opportunities for 
the development of firms in their portfolio. To this end, VCs can use the information they obtain 
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in their due diligence, advice, and monitoring processes in their portfolio of firms in order to 
match the development needs of a given firm (e.g., Aoki, 2000; Lindsey, 2008).  
The foregoing arguments suggest that entrepreneurial ventures can at the margin avoid 
costly search and evaluation to select R&D alliance partners by relying on their VCs to draw 
information about favorable partners from the VC’s pool of investee firms. Given that the 
incentives of VCs are aligned towards boosting the prospects of firms in their portfolio and 
enhancing their overall value, firms would positively judge the quality of the information 
conveyed by VCs about potential alliance partners. As a result, firms can mitigate 
misrepresentation risks as well as lower the costs related to due diligence activities when they 
select potential R&D alliance partners from their VC’s portfolio. By contrast, holding everything 
else constant, information asymmetries are more likely to be significant when the two 
entrepreneurial ventures do not have a common venture capitalist backing them (Lindsey, 2008). 
Thus, we offer the following baseline hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that an entrepreneurial venture selects a prospective R&D alliance 
partner is higher when they both are backed by a common VC investor. 
 
From the foregoing discussion, it follows that the benefits of having a common VC will 
turn upon the ability of entrepreneurial ventures to appraise potential collaborative opportunities 
between them.  The information intermediary role of VCs will therefore be especially useful for 
R&D partner selection when a firm cannot judge the value of prospective partners’ R&D assets 
and capabilities.  In particular, firms might find it difficult to assess the underlying technological 
resources and activities of prospective partner that are in their early stages of product 
development. During preliminary stages of product development, information about firm’s 
activities is scarce, and consequently informational asymmetries during early stages of product 
development can jeopardize alliancing opportunities for entrepreneurial firms. However, when 
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asymmetric information exists between firms, the intermediary role of VCs can be expected to be 
particularly useful.  
Partner Firms’ Product Development. During the early development stages of their 
technologies, entrepreneurial firms are usually short of track records that would provide 
information on their activities and technological resources (e.g, Amit et al., 1990; Shane and 
Stuart, 2002). In particular, when firms’ technologies are in the initial stages of development, 
verifiable information about the underlying capabilities of firms is very limited, and information 
about their R&D projects and product development initiatives can be costly for outsiders to 
obtain (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 2000; Ahuja, 2000). By contrast, when firms achieve progress in 
product development activities, information is produced about their R&D activities and helps 
prospective partners assess firms’ intangible assets and resources. In high-tech industries such as 
biopharmaceuticals, product development is usually subject to considerable uncertainty, is very 
resource intensive, and requires firms to invest their scarce resources to obtain success (e.g., 
Powell et al., 1996). Consequently, firms create a credible signal for outsiders about firms’ R&D 
capabilities when they are able to progress in their product development activities (e.g., 
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). In this regard, prospective partners seeking R&D alliance partners 
are more likely to partner with those firms that have advanced beyond the earliest stages of 
product development.  
Because stage of development is indicative of a firm’s progress and prospects for 
successful commercialization of technologies, firms that are in early stages of product 
development present greater information asymmetries and risk of adverse selection to potential 
partners, and this can impede alliance formation. As a result firms in their early stages of product 
development may fail to establish R&D partnerships with prospective collaborators and may 
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potentially lose out on opportunities for growth. Given this precarious situation for firms in early 
stages of product development they can benefit from the information intermediary role of their 
VCs highlighted earlier. In the absence of any credible record about a firm’s product 
development prospects and capabilities potential alliance partners can learn about a firm’s 
underlying activities from the common VC investor. Thus, we posit: 
Hypothesis 2:  The positive effect of a common VC investor on the likelihood of that an 
entrepreneurial venture selects a prospective R&D alliance partner will be 
greater when the entrepreneurial venture is in an early stage of product 
development. 
 
In the foregoing hypothesis, we suggest that the significance of VC information 
intermediation on alliance formation will be contingent on the product development stage of 
prospective alliance partners. While product development stage is a useful indicator for firms to 
learn about activities of prospective alliance partners, firms might be able to become familiar 
with prospective exchange partners’ technologies, irrespective of their development stages. Prior 
research suggests that there are least two primary ways in which potential partners can be 
familiar with the nature and quality of each other’s resources. First, firms can accumulate partner 
specific knowledge and become more familiar with the quality of a partner’s resources and 
capabilities through prior alliance relationships (e.g., Gulati, 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). 
Second, firms that have drawn knowledge from each other’s technological activities are more 
likely to be equipped with the relevant information about their partners’ capabilities (e.g., 
Mowery et al., 1998). Because the above two dyadic features enable prospective partners to have 
learned about each other and directly reduce information asymmetries, we expect that they both 
will weaken the positive effect of VC information intermediation on R&D partner selection. By 
contrast, when firms lack firsthand knowledge about each other’s technological and other 
resources because they lack prior ties or draw upon different knowledge, information 
15 
 
asymmetries are greater, and the VC information intermediation effect is likely to be more 
pronounced for R&D partner selection. Below we discuss the contingent effects of technological 
familiarity in terms of partner-specific experience and cross citations.   
Partner-Specific Experience. Previous collaborative agreements between firms are very 
useful in enabling firms to develop an understanding and specific knowledge about one another’s 
technological resources. So, we expect that the significance of information intermediation by a 
common VC will diminish for prospective partners that already have gained partner specific 
experience through prior alliance relationship with each other. By contrast, and paralleling the 
arguments developed earlier, we expect that the effects of backing by a common VC will be 
more pronounced for two firms without previous alliances together. 
Prior alliance agreements enable partner specific-experience and provide ways for 
prospective partners to gather information about each other’s research and other activities (e.g., 
Gulati, 1995a) and reduce uncertainties related to information disclosure (Vanhaverbeke et al., 
2002; Zaheer et al., 2010). Prior collaborations provide prospective R&D partners with rich 
information about each other’s technological know-how and deepen partners’ familiarity 
concerning each other’s competencies (e.g., Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002; Vanneste and Puranam, 
2010). In particular, in the context of R&D alliances, prior alliance relationships enable firms to 
accumulate information about partners’ intangible R&D resources and avoid misrepresentation 
risks (e.g., Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). Further, prior relationships between prospective 
partners enable them to accumulate knowledge about each other’s technological endowments 
and pursue new opportunities together that emerge during the course of collaboration. Given that 
prior relationships provide firms access to fine-grained information about partners’ technological 
resources and activities, prospective partners can obviate the need for costly investments in due 
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diligence activities.  By contrast, when entrepreneurial ventures lack collaborative experience 
with each other, they will find it particularly valuable to rely upon a common VC to provide rich 
information about each other’s technological resources and activities.  Thus, we posit: 
Hypothesis 3:  The positive effect of a common VC investor on the likelihood that an 
entrepreneurial venture selects a prospective R&D alliance partner will diminish 
with partner-specific experience. 
 
Cross Citations. When prospective partners draw upon each other’s knowledge bases, 
they can become familiar with each other’s technological resources, even when they have not 
had formal collaborative agreements together in the past. When firms have developed such a 
direct understanding about potential R&D partners’ technological endowments, they are better 
equipped to evaluate the underlying quality of their resources and mitigate the risk of adverse 
selection in a prospective partnership (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). One way in which firms 
become familiar with each other’s technological resources is when they mutually draw on each 
other’s knowledge bases in their prior technological activities such as patenting (e.g., Mowery et 
al., 1998). For instance, in high-tech industries such as biotechnology, prospective partners that 
cite each other’s patents would have a superior understanding about their partners’ technological 
endowments and can avoid costly due diligence to evaluate each other’s critical resources (e.g., 
Stuart, 1998). When prospective R&D partners extensively draw on each other’s knowledge 
bases they accumulate knowledge about partners’ difficult-to-evaluate intangible R&D resources 
and can utilize it to recognize and appreciate potential collaborative opportunities with each 
other (e.g., Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Gilsing et al., 2008). However, when firms lack such 
knowledge about potential partners’ technological endowments they may find it difficult to 
accurately assess the quality of partners’ technological resources (e.g., Gulati, 1999; Nicholson et 
al., 2005), and would benefit from the information mediated by a common VC investor on a 
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firm’s research progress, plans, market prospects, and the like.  Under these conditions, all else 
equal information asymmetry is apt to be higher, so the information mediation role of VCs is 
likely to take on greater importance for alliance partner selection.  We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 4:  The positive effect of a common VC investor on the likelihood that an 
entrepreneurial venture selects a prospective R&D alliance partner will diminish 
when they mutually draw on each other’s knowledge bases through patent cross 
citations. 
 
Technology Relatedness. In the foregoing hypotheses we discussed how the positive 
effect of VC information intermediation on R&D alliance formation is contingent on the extent 
partner firms have firsthand knowledge about each other’s technological and other resources that 
accrues from partner specific experience and drawing upon each other’s knowledge bases. 
Partner firms can also be able to directly assess each other’s technological resources insofar there 
is commonality among their activities and underlying technological resources. Because a firm’s 
absorptive capacity will be salient in the areas in which it is active, firms will find it difficult to 
comprehend the nature of opportunities outside of their areas of technological operations 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Gilsing et al., 2008). Firms would therefore face significant 
information asymmetries when technological activities of prospective R&D partners are 
unrelated, and firms would have to make costly investments to understand and judge the 
technologies of prospective partners (Stuart, 1998). However, the presence of a common VC 
investor can help firms avoid these informational problems and yet know about the difficult-to-
evaluate resources of partner firms that are technologically less related to them. Given that VCs 
obtain information about a firm’s activities through their due diligence, advice, and monitoring 
processes, the likelihood that prospective R&D partners that share a common VC would 
collaborate with each other will be more pronounced when there is less overlap in their 
technological activities. By contrast, the effect of having a common VC as an information 
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intermediary would diminish for partners that are technologically more related, since 
commonality of technology allows partner firms to evaluate each other’s technological resources. 
Thus, we posit: 
Hypothesis 5:  The positive effect of a common VC investor on the likelihood that an 
entrepreneurial venture selects a prospective R&D alliance partner will diminish 
with the technology relatedness between them. 
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
To investigate the underexplored information intermediary role of VCs in shaping firms’ 
R&D partner selection decisions, we focus on alliances among entrepreneurial ventures in the 
biotechnology industry. This industry context is interesting and appropriate for our analysis for 
several reasons.  Biotechnology firms extensively rely upon alliances to obtain technological and 
other resources that are critical for their development and growth (e.g., Powell, Koput, and 
Doerr-Smith, 1996; Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006; Anand, Oriani, and Vassolo, 2010), yet the 
capabilities and prospects of these entrepreneurial ventures can be difficult to evaluate due to 
their intangible resources and short track records (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 
2003; Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough, 2005; Levitas and McFadyen, 2009).  Moreover, 
alliances as well as venture capital are the two principal means by which biotechnology startups 
obtain necessary resources (e.g., Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Hochberg et al., 2007), and venture 
capital is also extensively used in this industry compared to other high-tech industries in which 
R&D alliances are also common (e.g., semiconductors).  Rich information is available on 
characteristics of firms’ relationships with venture capitalists as well as firms’ technological 
activities, enabling an investigation of whether and when common VCs facilitation partner 
selection for R&D collaborations. 
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In order to investigate the intermediary role of VCs on who partners with whom, our 
research design needed to accommodate pairs of biopharmaceutical firms that collaborated 
together as well as those that did not engage each other in collaboration. We obtained data on 
alliances that occurred in the biotech setting from Thomson Reuters’ Recap database.  Recap has 
been actively tracking transactions at all levels in the biopharmaceuticals industry since the 
1980s, and it is a reliable source for obtaining a representative coverage of alliance agreements in 
this sector (Schilling, 2009).  We identified alliance dyads for which both firms are VC backed 
by mapping each partner to the venture capital data provided by Thomson Financial’s Venture 
Economics database. These two data sources have been employed extensively by researchers in 
management, economics, and finance to investigate questions related to venture financing and 
cooperative strategies in the biopharmaceuticals industry (e.g., Robinson and Stuart, 2007; 
Adegbesan and Higgins, 2011). 
In our study we explore the information intermediation effect of VCs on the likelihood of 
alliance formation between firms. Our analyses therefore require sampling on alliance dyads 
between VC backed firms that actually occurred and constructing a set of corresponding 
counterfactuals that are nonrealized collaborations. For a given realized alliance dyad, we built 
the set of nonrealized alliances by considering all firms from the universe of VC backed firms 
that are present in the biopharmaceutical industry at the time of the focal realized alliance dyad.  
This offers a comprehensive set of nonrealized deals and enables us to exploit heterogeneity in 
the sample for testing the hypotheses in an unbiased way when information is lacking a priori on 
those dyads for which a collaboration is feasible or likely (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999).  In 
supplemental analyses, we also examined more restrictive sets of nonrealized alliances based on 
certain matching criteria and found consistent results. Specifically, we generated counterfactuals 
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for a focal alliance dyad by considering all possible alliance dyads that are matched on industry 
subgroup, therapeutic area, and state location with the focal realized alliance dyad. Our results 
are robust across these specifications for the set of nonrealized alliance dyads.  In supplemental 
analyses covered below, we also discuss a range of alternative risk sets and find the same 
interpretations for hypothesis testing.  
To construct our final samples for analysis, we employed an additional set of sampling 
criteria. First, we included deals that are classified by Recap as research, collaboration, 
development, co-development, market, co-market, promote, co-promote, manufacture, and 
license type agreements, and an alliance may involve more than one deal type. In this manner, 
we focus on alliances that have research, R&D, or R&D plus other activities (e.g., Oxley, 1997). 
Second, we focused on alliances that were formed between the years 1985 and 2011. Activity in 
alliance and private equity markets experienced significant growth in the biotechnology industry 
during this period (e.g., Lerner and Merges, 1998). Third, we considered only those alliance 
dyads where firms in a dyad had obtained at least first round VC funding, and both firms were 
operating as private entities at the time of the R&D collaboration. Given our focus on how 
having a common VC can facilitate R&D collaborations between entrepreneurial ventures, we 
excluded firms that had already gone public since venture capitalists might no longer be involved 
in such firms and more information is available to collaborators on the performance and quality 
of these companies (Gompers and Lerner, 2004).  Further, we excluded firms that had received 
their last round of VC funding at least seven years before the time of a focal R&D collaboration, 
in order to exclude firms that are defunct, or “living dead” (e.g., Ruhnka, Feldman, and Dean, 
1992).  
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Next, we combined these data with patent information from the US Patent and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) after 
tracking company histories and name changes. Further, we also gathered data on the biotech 
product development activities of all firms in our sample from the Orange Book, which is a 
library of approved drug products of all firms in the biotechnology industry and is managed by 
the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In order to reduce unobserved 
heterogeneity from cross-border transactions, we limited our analyses to VC-backed 
biotechnology firms based in the US. After implementing these sampling screens, we obtained 
an initial sample of 87562 realized and non-realized alliance deals, of which 156 were R&D 
partnerships that occurred. Descriptive statistics on the sample appear in the results section 
below. 
Variables and Measurement 
Dependent Variable. We examine the likelihood two entrepreneurial ventures in the 
biopharmaceutical industry partner with each other to form an R&D alliance. Accordingly, the 
dependent variable is R&D Alliance Formation, which takes on a value of 1 for realized alliances 
and zero for dyads of non-realized transactions. Considering the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable, we specified logistic regression models for our analyses. In supplemental 
analyses, we specified rare events logistic regression models since the likelihood of R&D 
collaboration in our sample of R&D collaborations (i.e., around 1 percent) may differ from the 
population (King and Zeng, 2001).  We also randomly picked non-realized alliances (e.g., 5 or 
10) for each realized R&D collaboration, and we found the same interpretations as those 
presented below. 
Independent Variables. Our first hypothesis considered whether two firms are more 
likely to engage in an R&D collaboration with each other if they have a common VC, compared 
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to firms that are backed by completely different venture capitalists. Common VC is therefore a 
dyadic measure and takes on the value of 1 if a VC firm invested in both firms within the three 
years prior to the date of the focal alliance, and 0 otherwise. Because firms might share more 
than one VC (e.g., the maximum is five in our sample), we also measured this variable using the 
count of the VCs the two firms share at the time of the partner selection decision, and we 
obtained the same interpretations as those presented below. 
Our remaining hypotheses reflect contingencies that shape the information asymmetries 
between potential partners and hence the degree to which having a common VC investor 
facilitates partner selection.  Our second hypothesis suggested that the VC information 
intermediation effect on alliance formation will be more pronounced when potential R&D 
collaboration partners are in early stages of product development. Given that firms’ products 
reflects their progress in product development, we measured Firm Product Development and 
Partner Product Development as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is at least one drug 
application approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration agency for them at the time of 
the R&D collaboration, and 0 otherwise.  
In Hypothesis 3 and 4 we suggested that the positive effects of having a common VC 
investor on R&D partner selection will diminish with technological familiarity between 
entrepreneurial ventures in terms of partner firms’ first-hand information about each other’s 
technological resources. Specifically, our third hypothesis suggested that the positive effects of 
having a common VC investor on partner selection will be contingent on partnering experience 
between the firms. Specifically, the positive effect of having a common VC investor on alliance 
formation is expected to diminish with the degree of familiarity between firms through their prior 
alliance relationships, which provide knowledge about each other’s activities and resources. 
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Accordingly, we measured Partner Specific Experience as the number of alliances between the 
firms during the five years prior to the focal alliance. We also measured this variable for 
different time windows such as three years and seven years and found interpretations similar to 
those presented below.  
Our fourth hypothesis suggested that the positive effects of having a common VC 
investor on partner selection will be moderated by the extent that partner firms draw upon each 
other’s knowledge bases. We measured this in terms of the number of patent Cross Citations 
between a firm and its potential partner during the five years prior to the date of the focal alliance 
(e.g., Mowery et al., 1996; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). We also measured this variable for 
different time windows such as three years and seven years and found interpretations similar to 
those presented below. 
In Hypothesis 5 we suggested that the positive effects of having a common VC investor 
on partner selection will be contingent on the extent of commonality of technological activities 
between partner firms. We measured Technology Relatedness as the cosine of the angular 
separation in firms’ patents across patent classes, which is often used as a measure of the degree 
of similarity in two firms’ patent portfolios (e.g., Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe, 2006; 
Li, Eden, Hitt, and Ireland, 2008). We followed Jaffe (1986) in calculating this measure as the 
normalized scalar product of the patent class distribution vectors of firms in a dyad during the 
last five years prior to the focal alliance. We also measured this variable for different time 
windows such as three years and seven years and found interpretations similar to those presented 
below.  
We also performed a number of robustness tests to explore the temporal sequence of the 
common VC variable and the dyadic moderating variables as well as to ensure the common VC 
24 
 
variable is measured more recently than the others, which the common VC might itself shape.  
For example, we measured partner specific experience, cross citations, and technology 
relatedness before different time windows in which we gauged involvement by a common VC 
(e.g., three years and five years) and the findings are quite consistent across the different sets of 
analyses and support our hypothesized relationships.  
Control Variables. In our models we introduced several controls that could be related to 
firms’ technological resources and their affiliations with venture capitalists, as well as the 
likelihood of forging R&D collaborations. Specifically, we included control variables that 
account for dyad-level as well as firm-level characteristics to address the determinants of who 
partners with whom. To begin with, prospective R&D alliance partners may find it harder to 
locate as well as evaluate each other when they are farther apart, thereby reducing the likelihood 
of R&D collaboration between entrepreneurial ventures. We control for geographic distance 
between firms, measured as the natural logarithm of the great circle distance between the 
headquarters of the firms (i.e., Distance).  
Given that both firms in our alliance dyads are VC backed, we also accounted for 
characteristics of their VCs and the firms’ funding activity. Specifically, we controlled for the 
prominence of the VCs backing the firms in a dyad as the likelihood that they partner with other 
firms increases with the signals conveyed by affiliations with prominent venture capitalists.  
Following Hsu (2006), we calculated Firm VC Prominence and Partner VC Prominence as the 
natural logarithm of the Bonacich centrality of the most central VC backing them (e.g., 
Bonacich, 1987; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). More specifically, we calculated the eigenvector 
centrality of each VC backing the firm within the VC syndication network, in order to capture 
both the direct and indirect ties among venture capitalists (Bonacich, 1987). We defined the 
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centrality of a VC firm, indexed by i, as the Bonacich two-parameter measure in year t using a 
five-year time window between t-5 and t: 
(1) VC firm centralityi,t (Ci,t)  =  ∑ (𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝐶𝑗 ,𝑡 )𝑅𝑖,𝑗 ,𝑡
𝑁𝑡
𝑗=1  
where Cj,t is the centrality score of VC firm j in year t, and Ri,j,t is an element of the relationship 
matrix Rt, indicating the co-investments between VC firms i and j during the five year window. 
αt is a scale parameter chosen so that the sum of the squares of centralities of all firms in a 
network in a given year equals the number of units in the network (i.e., Nt). βt is a weighting 
coefficient, indicating the effect of centralities of investment partners on the firm’s centrality and 
is conventionally set to three-fourths of the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue of the 
relationship matrix Rt.  
We also accounted for the cumulative VC funding received by the firms, their number of 
VC rounds, and their respective stages of VC investment. Previous studies suggest that VC firms 
periodically evaluate the progress of ventures in their portfolio to decide whether or not to 
continue investing in a venture (e.g., Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995). In addition, these variables 
also reflect a venture’s maturity and experience (e.g., Lerner and Merges, 1998). We calculated 
Firm VC Funding and Partner VC Funding as the natural logarithm of the total dollar amount of 
VC funding received prior to the focal alliance. Dyad VC Investment Stage is a dummy variable 
that takes on the value of one if the VC funding for at least one of the firms in an alliance dyad is 
reported as either seed stage or early stage at the time of R&D collaboration, and zero otherwise. 
In addition, we also measured Firm VC Bio Investment Experience and Partner VC Bio 
Investment Experience to account for the biotech investment experience of VCs backing the 
firms.  We measure these variables as the natural log of the number of prior rounds of funding in 
the biotechnology industry, and we took the maximum values for the VCs backing the firms.   
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For firms in the biotechnology industry, firms’ prior technological achievements can also 
convey information about their technological capabilities and prospects (e.g., Stuart, 2000; 
Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). We account for the quality of firms’ patents and measured Firm 
Citations and Partner Citations as the natural logarithm of forward patent citations received by 
them during the last five years prior to the focal alliance (e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg, 2005).  
The alliance activity of a firm may also shape the resources to which it has access and 
may also convey to prospective partners that its resources are in demand by other organizations 
(e.g., Gulati, 1995b; Stuart et al., 1999; Nicholson et al., 2005; Cuypers and Martin, 2010). 
Similar to venture capitalists, previous alliance partners have carried out evaluations of the firm’s 
resources and capabilities (e.g., Luo, 1997; Hitt et al., 2004; Ring, Doz, and Olk, 2005; Shah and 
Swaminathan, 2008), and alliance partners are directly involved in the operations of the firm 
(Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Almeida, Song, and Grant, 2002; Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, and 
Noorderhaven, 2002). In addition, prospective partners that have already engaged in 
collaborations may be more effective in engaging in collaborative activities (Colombo, 2003; 
Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005; Hagedoorn et al., 2009).  We controlled for the previous research 
collaborations of the firms in the previous five years, using a log transformation (i.e., Firm 
Alliance Experience and Partner Alliance Experience). We also measured Firm Exploitative 
Experience and Partner Exploitative Experience as the natural logarithm of the number of 
alliances with only a development or commercialization component, but no research component, 
that were formed by the prospective partners in the last five years (e.g., Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006).  
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We also controlled for the age of entrepreneurial firms since startups may be 
technologically attractive to prospective partners but also can present greater uncertainty given 
their shorter track records (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Nicholson et al., 2005; Hsu, 2006). We 
measured Firm Age and Partner Age as the logged value of the age of both firms at the time of 
focal R&D collaboration. In addition, we also controlled for several other sources of unobserved 
effects. We defined Firm Patent Class Effects and Partner Patent Class Effects to control for 
whether firms in a dyad patented in particular 3-digit technology classes that might affect R&D 
collaboration (e.g., Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993). We also controlled for 
heterogeneity among industry subgroups of firms in our sample and included Firm Industry 
Subgroup Effects and Partner Subgroup Effects. Finally, we also included Therapeutic Area 
Effects and Year Effects to control for effects related to the therapeutic area of the focal alliance 
and the year during which an alliance was formed or not between the firms. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of variables used in our analyses. 
About three quarters of the realized alliances in our sample involve R&D or R&D plus other 
activities, and the remaining alliances are pure research agreements.  Roughly 54 percent of the 
alliances in our sample include “collaboration” or “co-development” agreements in which both 
partners actively conduct R&D activities.  Summary statistics indicate differences across the 
realized and non-realized collaborations for the key theoretical variables. For example, the 
proportion of firms having a common VC is 0.13 in the group of realized alliances, while it is 
only 0.05 for the non-realized collaborations (p<0.01). The average likelihood that any two firms 
form an alliance is 0.005 when they share a common VC, while it is 0.001 for firms that do not 
have a common VC (p<0.01). The average number of cross citations is greater for firms that 
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engage in future partnerships (i.e., 0.08) versus those that do not collaborate (i.e., 0.004) 
(p<0.05). The average number of prior ties is 0.08 for partners engaging in an alliance together, 
and 0.002 for the group of non-realized alliances (p<0.01). Similarly, the average technological 
relatedness is greater for firms that engage in partnerships (i.e., 0.18) versus those that do not 
collaborate (i.e., 0.07) (p<0.001). Correlations also indicate that firms are also more likely to 
partner with each other when they are closer to each other (p<0.001).  
Firms with a more prominent VC backing them are also more likely to share a common 
VC with prospective collaborators (p<0.001), just as common VCs are more likely to involve 
venture capitalists experienced in biotechnology (p<0.001). Firms that share a common VC and 
partner with each other are more likely to be in their early stages of product development 
(p<0.001). Potential collaborators that have fewer cross citations and partner specific experience 
and yet partner with each other are more likely to share a common VC (p<0.01). Correlations 
among the variables are generally modest and the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) for 
the variables is 2.45, providing no evidence of multicollinearity in the estimated models. 
***Insert Table 1 here*** 
Table 2 reports the estimates of logistic regression models for the partner selection 
analyses. Model 1 is a baseline specification consisting of control variables, and Model 2 
augments this model with the direct effect of the common VC variable. Hypothesis 1 suggests 
that firms are more likely to partner with each other when they share a VC investor.  The 
multivariate estimation results confirm that the incidence of R&D collaboration between any two 
firms is greater when they have a common VC investing in them (p<0.001). Thus, H1 is 
supported.  We also investigated the economic significance of this effect on the likelihood of 
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R&D alliance formation between two firms. With all variables at their means, the likelihood of 
R&D collaboration increases approximately twofold when they have a common VC.  
***Insert Tables 2 and 3 here*** 
Models 1-5 in Table 3 report the estimates for our hypothesized interactions, and Model 6 
is the full model that contains all interactions estimated at once.  Hypotheses 2 suggests that the 
positive effect of having a common VC investor on R&D alliance formation will be contingent 
on a partnering firm’s progress in product development. Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 suggest the 
moderating effects of the degree of technological familiarity between firms in terms in terms of 
partner firms’ direct knowledge about each other’s technological resources that could be a result 
of their cross-citations, partner specific experience, and relatedness of their technology 
portfolios, respectively. Consistent with H2, the coefficient estimate of the interaction between 
common VC and product development stage is negative and significant (p<0.001). In accord 
with H3, the coefficient estimate of the interaction between partner specific experience and 
common VC is negative and significant (p<0.001). Consistent with H4, the coefficient estimate 
of the interaction between common VC and cross citations variable is negative and significant 
(p<0.001). Finally, hypothesis 5 suggested that the positive effect of having a common VC on 
R&D alliance formation will be greater between partner firms that do not share similar 
technological activities. The coefficient estimate of the interaction between common VC and 
technology relatedness is negative and significant (p<0.001), as expected.  
It is well recognized that interpreting interaction effects is difficult in nonlinear models 
such as logistic regression (e.g., Hoetker, 2007). So, we also examined the marginal effects for 
individual observations of the interaction effects, and found them to be consistent with our 
interpretations. Further, we also examined the interaction effects graphically (please see Figures 
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1-5).  For instance, Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the interaction effect between common VC variable 
and partner firms’ product development. It indicates that the positive effect of a common VC will 
be greater for partner firms that are in their early stages of product development. Figures 3 and 4 
illustrate the interaction effect between common VC variable and familiarity about prospective 
alliance partners in terms of cross citations and partner specific experience, respectively. The 
figures illustrate that the positive effect of having a common VC on the likelihood of R&D 
collaboration is evident only when firms lack direct experience with each other through cross 
citations and prior collaborations.  Similarly, Figure 5 illustrates that a one standard deviation 
decrease from the mean in technology relatedness increases the positive effect of having a 
common VC on likelihood of alliance formation greater by almost 15 percent. Together, these 
figures provide evidence that backing by a common VC can privately and directly reduce 
information asymmetries between two firms and can be especially valuable for two firms that 
lack first-hand knowledge of each other’s technological resources (i.e., due to stage of product 
development, lack of cross-citations or previous collaborations, and dissimilar technology 
portfolios) is an important boundary condition shaping the impact of the information 
intermediary role of VCs in markets for alliance partners. 
***Insert Figures 1-5 here*** 
 Finally, the results for some of the control variables are also noteworthy.  While our 
theory and evidence indicates how VCs can provide an information intermediary role in 
facilitating R&D partnerships, particularly when partners face significant information 
asymmetries, our findings suggest other roles that VCs can play in enabling these alliances.  
There is some evidence that firms are able to attract partnerships when their VCs are prominent, 
as this signal on firms’ technological resources and prospects extends broadly to would-be 
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collaborators (Hsu, 2006).  The level of funding by venture capitalists does not appear to enable 
collaborations overall, however.  We also see that firms’ previous alliance ties as well as 
downstream or upstream alliance experiences with other organizations can have a bearing on 
alliance formation.  As a final example, we see that geographic distance appears to be a friction 
for alliance formation as firms tend to prefer to partner with geographically nearby collaborators.  
Robustness Analyses 
In supplemental analyses we have examined several possible alternative explanations for 
the VC intermediation effect on alliance formation between firms (results available upon 
request). For instance, it is possible to argue that a focal VC could see value in two ventures in 
his portfolio collaborating with each other as a consequence of either homophily or portfolio 
super-additivity considerations.  For instance, homophily would suggest that venture capitalists 
might invest in firms with similar technological resources, and they might then collaborate due to 
the firms sharing such underlying similarities (e.g., Kossinets and Watts, 2009).  Their similar 
technological resources might also present super-additive value that VCs recognize for a 
potential collaboration (e.g., Vassolo et al., 2004).  Whereas these explanations would suggest a 
positive interaction between the common VC and technology relatedness variables, the 
information intermediation effect would suggest the opposite, which we observe in support of 
Hypothesis 5:  information asymmetries are greater when the ventures’ technological resources 
are more dissimilar, so the positive common VC effect will be greater in this situation inasmuch 
as this effect is due to the information intermediation mechanism. We obtained similar 
interpretations when we employed common patent citations as an indicator of the similarity 
between partners’ technological activities (e.g., Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1998; 
Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). We have also investigated the possibility that a common VC 
might exert its (e.g., ownership) in bringing portfolio companies together in partnerships by 
32 
 
considering the amount of cumulative investment by the common VCs in both partner firms 
(e.g., Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995), yet we did not find any evidence for this effect on alliance 
formation. 
Furthermore, we also considered a number of situations where firms face an express need 
to partner or look for opportunities for alliance formation. For example, we examined whether 
the intermediary role of VCs is more useful when prospective partner firms need partners and yet 
face difficulties in attracting partners. In particular, we examined whether having a common VC 
is more beneficial for bridging alliances between partner firms that are in their nascent stage of 
venture activity. Firms that are in their nascent stage of venture activity look for alliance 
opportunities with potential partners to overcome resource constraints. However, they often fail 
to attract partners because of their poor information conditions. In our analysis, we found that the 
intermediary role of a common VC is more significant for potential partner firms when at least 
one of them is in its nascent stage of venture activity. This is in accord with our theory and 
evidence on the effects of having a common VC when firms are at an early stage of product 
development.  We did not observe similar effects when we examined age as a contingency, 
presumably because firm age reflects many theoretical considerations, so overall we see that 
contingencies more directly tied to information asymmetries surrounding firms’ technological 
resources and their prospects matter to partner selection and the build-up of R&D partnerships in 
the biotechnology industry. 
We performed a number of additional analyses in order to examine the sensitivity of our 
particular findings and interpretations. Specifically, we examined whether our results are robust 
to alternative sampling approaches since different ones have merits and practices vary in the 
literature on the selection of exchange partners (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Sorenson and 
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Stuart, 2001; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008). While we constructed our main sample for analyses 
in a comprehensive way by generating all the possible dyads for a given realized alliance dyad in 
order to exploit heterogeneity in the sample for testing the hypotheses (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999), we also constructed several additional sets of counterfactuals based on certain matching 
criteria. To begin with, we obtained non-realized dyads that are matched on industry subgroup 
for the partnering firms, therapeutic area, and state location (estimation results appear in Table 
4). The VentureExpert database provides industry subgroup classifications (such as biotech-
human, biotech-research, and pharmaceutical) of the entire sample of biopharmaceutical firms.  
For instance, suppose there is a realized alliance dyad where the firms belong to biotech-research 
and biotech-human subgroups, respectively, while the therapeutic focus of the alliance is 
cardiovascular. To construct the counterfactuals, we considered all potential dyads that belong to 
biotech-research and biotech-human subgroups, with firms that have cardiovascular as one of 
their active therapeutic areas. We also developed samples of non-realized alliances from matches 
on industry subgroup alone or industry subgroup and therapeutic area, and we obtained the same 
interpretations.   
***Insert Table 4 here*** 
Given that we focus on the common VC variable and its interactions, we also considered 
the potential endogeneity of this core variable.  While a particular VC is probably not likely to 
invest in two firms given their prospects for future collaboration, and this mitigates potential 
feedback relationships in our dyadic analyses (e.g., Hayashi, 2000), we wanted to empirically 
examine the potential endogeneity of the common VC variable using Heckman’s approach. We 
relied on the fact that VCs cluster in California and prefer to invest in nearby firms, so we used a 
dummy variable to indicate whether or not both potential partners are based in California (e.g., 
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Baker and Gompers, 2003).  This variable is positively correlated with backing by a common VC 
(p<0.001) but is not related to alliance formation.  We estimated a first stage probit model 
examining the determinants of having a common VC, and in a second stage model of alliance 
partner selection examined whether the common VC variable is endogenous. The insignificance 
of the inverse mills ratio in this model indicated that we could not reject the null of exogeneity 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  
DISCUSSION 
Contribution and Implications 
In this study, we extend information economics to the literature on partner selection for 
R&D collaborations and advance research by investigating a new role of VCs -- information 
intermediation -- in shaping partner selection for entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., Lindsey, 2008). 
Specifically, we examine the information intermediary role of VCs in reducing information 
asymmetries between entrepreneurial ventures and hypothesize on who partners with whom and 
how R&D partnerships get built up within high-tech industries. Given the difficulties firms might 
have in understanding and evaluating the resources and prospects of potential R&D partners, VC 
affiliations can provide remedies to the risk of adverse selection and have important implications 
for who partners with whom and how markets for alliance partners become segmented in high-
tech industries. Prior research that investigated the role of VCs in R&D partner selection has 
focused on the signaling role of prominent VC affiliations in shaping firms’ R&D alliance 
decisions (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al., 2013).  Signals of prominent VC affiliations are widely 
available to exchange partners and a significant means for overcoming the hazards of 
information asymmetries. By contrast, the information intermediary role of a VC that we 
investigate in this paper privately and directly reduces information asymmetries between 
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prospective partners, and it is a novel way in which VCs can remedy the risk of adverse selection 
and influence who partners with whom in the market for R&D alliances.  
At a broad level, we therefore complement previous research on partner selection that 
examined the signaling role of VCs (e.g., Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al., 2013) by investigating the 
information intermediary role of the VCs. In particular, we argue and show that information 
intermediation of VCs helps prospective partners learn about the underlying quality of each 
other’s technological resources and activities, and it is particularly valuable for entrepreneurial 
ventures that find it difficult to overcome information asymmetries on their own when seeking 
potential R&D alliance partners. Our findings suggest that the information intermediary role of a 
VC has a more impactful role in partner selection for entrepreneurial ventures that face adverse 
selection risks on account of their inability to determine the quality of potential R&D partners’ 
intangible assets and capabilities.  
Specifically, as a potential R&D partner’s progress in product development corresponds 
with the information about its underlying technological resources and activities, we find that the 
VC information intermediation will be more useful to mitigate informational risks when firms 
find it challenging to evaluate the resources of potential R&D partners that are yet in early stages 
of product development. The information intermediary role of VCs on R&D partner selection 
can also matter more or less for firms on the basis of their knowledge about prospective R&D 
alliance partners. Firms can also be better able to judge the quality of prospective partners’ 
technological resources when they are familiar with potential partners’ activities. In particular, 
partner specific experience that comes from prior alliance relations between potential R&D 
collaborators provides information about each other’s technological resources and R&D 
activities, and our findings indicate that VC information intermediation is particularly useful 
36 
 
when prospective exchange partners lack such partner specific experience. We also considered 
how firms that extensively draw on each other’s knowledge bases become familiar about each 
other’s technological resources, and we find that the VC information intermediation is 
particularly useful when prospective exchange partners lack such familiarity with potential 
partners’ knowledge bases. Further, prospective R&D alliance partners can also be able to 
directly assess each other’s technological resources insofar there is commonality among their 
activities and underlying technological resources, and we find that the VC information 
intermediation effect would be more valuable for partners that are technologically dissimilar 
from each other. In this manner, we identify specific contingencies when information 
asymmetries about partner firms’ technological resources and activities tend to be greatest 
between firms, and in so doing we identify some critical boundary conditions related to the value 
of the information intermediary function that VCs can fulfill for R&D collaborations.  These 
contingencies help to understand the mechanism underlying the common VC effect we observe 
and enable us to rule out alternative explanations why companies in a VC’s portfolio have a 
more pronounced tendency to collaborate with one another. 
This paper contributes in several specific ways to the literature on strategic alliances, and 
especially to research on partner selection for R&D collaborations. First, our extension of 
information economics to the literature on partner selection adds to other theories used to 
understand which partners a firm selects or should select. For instance, much of the research on 
partner selection emphasizes how firms should prioritize exchange partners that present strategic, 
organizational, and cultural fit, as well as those having complementary resources, for effective 
alliance implementation (e.g., Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Luo, 1997; Hitt et al., 2004; Ring et 
al., 2005; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Shah and Swaminathan, 2008; Beamish and Lupton, 
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2009; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009; Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). Our theory suggests that in 
spite of such resource considerations for selecting exchange partners, firms often confront 
inefficiencies and difficulties in judging each other’s technological and other resources in the 
first place. We argued and showed how the information intermediation function of VCs can 
privately and directly address informational frictions that crop up in the partner search processes. 
Specifically, our study advances prior research that has investigated the importance of firms’ 
resources in R&D partner selection (e.g., Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Diestre and 
Rajagopalan, 2012) and suggests that the VC information intermediation is particularly valuable 
for firms when they lack first-hand knowledge about each other’s technological resources.  
By investigating the underexplored information intermediary role of VCs in R&D partner 
selection and how it matters when firms face information asymmetries surrounding their 
technological resources and activities, we make an important contribution to research on the role 
of VCs in new ventures’ growth prospects and on the informational spillovers VCs have on other 
markets. This body of research has emphasized the signaling role of VCs and has shown that 
backing by prominent VCs can provide signals on high-tech new ventures that facilitate IPOs, 
acquisitions, and partnerships (e.g., Stuart et al., 1999; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Chang, 2004; 
Hsu, 2006; Ozmel et al., 2013). We build upon and advance this research by demonstrating the 
influence of VCs in intermediating relationships with exchange partners by functioning as 
credible third-parties who privately and directly reduce information asymmetries between 
prospective partners and influence partner selection for R&D alliances. In this way, we also 
contribute to research about the value-added role of VCs in the development of firms (e.g., 
Hellman and Puri, 2002; Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006; Lindsey, 2008; Jackson et al., 2012).  Our 
findings suggest that future research might consider the multiple ways that VCs can affect the 
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development of firms as well as the returns they obtain in market contexts such as strategic 
alliances, mergers and acquisitions, and so forth. 
Beyond exploring the information intermediary role of VCs in R&D partner selection 
when firms face information asymmetries surrounding their technological resources, our study 
also contributes more broadly to research on interorganizational relationships and the role of 
information intermediaries. For research that has examined the value of prior relationships in 
reducing uncertainty between firms (e.g., Gulati, 1995a, 1999; Chung et al., 2000), our study 
suggests that prospective exchange partners can also obtain informational benefits from VCs as 
third-party intermediaries providing indirect ties between organizations. We also extend prior 
research suggesting that firms can exploit alliance opportunities through the social networks of 
their top management team (e.g., Gulati and Westphal, 1999) by showing that VCs can function 
as credible intermediaries who reduce information asymmetries between prospective partners. 
Since VCs invest in new ventures and intensively monitor them and have access to private 
information about new ventures’ resources that is difficult to observe for outsiders (e.g., 
Gompers and Lerner, 2001), our theory about the information intermediary role of VCs suggests 
that this role is particularly valuable for new ventures that face severe information asymmetry 
about alliance partners’ technological resources. By emphasizing that VC intermediation can 
reduce adverse selection risks in R&D partner selection, our study therefore complements 
previous research by suggesting that the role of information intermediaries in interorganizational 
relationships can be approached from multiple theoretical perspectives.  For example, Sleptsov, 
Anand, and Vasudeva (2013) examine relationships between acquiring firms and investment 
banks to understand how relational configurations can enhance intermediaries’ willingness and 
ability to provide information.  Given our focus on high-tech, privately-held startups and the 
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information asymmetries that surround such firms’ technological resources in particular, we 
emphasize the value of common VCs in mitigating hazards due to information asymmetries in 
prospective R&D collaborations. These intermediaries appear to matter most at the earliest 
stages of technology development and in cases where a potential exchange partner lacks 
familiarity with the firm’s technological resources and their commercial prospects. Since 
informational considerations broadly have a bearing on firms’ partner selection decisions, future 
research could also examine other types of interorganizational ties (e.g., corporate venture capital 
vs. independent VCs) and relationships (e.g., employee mobility) through which prospective 
partners can learn about each other’s resources and reduce adverse selection risks in alliance 
partner selection (e.g., Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Alvarez-Garrido and Dushnitsky, 2016).  
The degree to which these alternative channels substitute or complement each other in 
facilitating economic exchanges such as R&D alliances would also be valuable to investigate.  
We would encourage research that adopts other theoretical perspectives (e.g., the relational view, 
resource-based view, etc.) that would facilitate research on the ways in which third-parties such 
as VCs can help firms build valuable relationships and access resources lying outside firms’ 
boundaries.  
Finally, by showing how information economics contributes to understanding of partner 
selection for R&D alliances, we also complement other streams of alliance research that have 
used this perspective to investigate structural aspects of interfirm collaboration. Specifically, 
previous empirical research has focused upon the deals that have been formed and emphasizes 
how firms make entry mode, governance, or alliance design decisions for these transactions 
based on the adverse selection risks or other exchange hazards that firms confront (e.g., 
Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Chi, 1994; Vanhaverberke, Duysters, and Noorderhaven, 2002; 
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Villalonga and McGahan, 2004; Cuypers and Martin, 2010).  By employing a dyadic perspective 
to investigate which firms engage in partnerships with whom and by accommodating non-
realized alliances in our research design, we allow for the possibility that firms contend with 
adverse selection prior to alliance contracting and implementing any ex post governance 
mechanisms.  As a consequence, we would suggest that information economics holds the 
potential to begin to integrate research on partner selection and alliance governance, and we 
would encourage future studies along these lines.  As a specific example, it would be value for 
future research to examine how partner selection and VC information intermediation also have a 
bearing upon the design of collaborations and the monitoring mechanisms firms employ during 
alliance execution.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
In addition to the research opportunities already noted, extensions might also pursue 
additional research opportunities presented by some of the specific limitations of this study. 
Given our interest in partner selection for R&D collaborations and the information intermediary 
role of VCs, we focused our analysis on R&D collaborations between VC-backed biotechnology 
firms. It would therefore be valuable in future research to examine other types of exchanges that 
occur between firms within VCs’ portfolios (e.g., buyer-supplier relationships, partnerships for 
other value chain activities, acquisitions, etc.) to investigate other potential ways that VCs can 
add value to their portfolio companies.  Such research would also be valuable in order to explore 
the generalizability of our findings to other industrial settings.  Similarly, since we have focused 
on firms situated in the US, it would be worthwhile to examine partner selection in international 
contexts in which information asymmetries might be higher between firms. 
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In order to examine how R&D markets for alliance partners become segmented based on 
informational considerations, we have used a set of realized partnerships and synthetic non-deals 
based several characteristics of firms and partnerships (e.g., therapeutic areas, geographic 
location, etc.).  This research design accommodates non-realized alliances as counterfactuals 
rather than sampling only upon completed transactions, and similar matching techniques are 
often used in prior research on alliances and other market transactions (e.g., Stuart, 1998; 
Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004; Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008).  However, a limitation of this 
empirical design lies in not knowing the actual search processes of firms regarding the R&D 
partners considered, the information sources employed, and the selection among partners as 
negotiations commence. For instance, primary data acquired through field surveys or 
longitudinal case studies can be used to verify the extent to which entrepreneurial firms rely on 
their VCs to overcome challenges related to the selection of potential alliance partners.  More 
broadly, such research could also enrich our understanding of how firms locate potential 
partners, the criteria they employ (including those from different theoretical perspectives besides 
the one we have emphasized), and how they use various advisers (e.g., consultants, attorneys, 
financial advisers, brokers, etc.) during these processes.  This research could examine the role of 
third-party intermediaries other than the venture capitalists that have been the focus of our study.  
This research could investigate whether information asymmetries or other theoretical 
considerations potentially explain the value that such third-parties bring to organizations carrying 
out alliances or other economic exchanges. 
While our study has focused upon how VC information intermediation might address 
adverse selection for entrepreneurial firms in the formation of R&D collaborations, our study is 
silent upon the performance implications for collaborators.  While our analysis adopts an 
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efficiency perspective in deriving hypotheses upon who partners with whom, in future research it 
would be valuable to investigate whether the information intermediary role of VC affiliations 
actually relieves inefficiencies that firms encounter during partner selection and in fact enhances 
the performance of R&D partnerships. Such research could investigate the degree to which 
partners experience performance penalties (e.g., lack of survival, execution problems, etc.) when 
they do not have a common VC or how they stand to benefit from the information intermediation 
function of common VCs.  Research along these lines on the information advantages of VCs 
might investigate the new technologies, products, or commercialization successes that result 
from collaborations fostered by venture capitalists. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statisticsa 
 
aN=87562, p<0.05 in bold 
 
 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
1 R&D Alliance Formation 1.00
2 Common VC 0.01 1.00
3 Technology Relatedness 0.02 0.04 1.00
4 Cross Citations 0.02 0.00 0.07 1.00
5 Partner Specific Experience 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00
6 Firm Product Development 0.00 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03 1.00
7 Partner Product Development 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 1.00
8 Distance -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 1.00
9 Firm VC Prominence 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.01 1.00
10 Partner VC Prominence 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 1.00
11 Firm VC Funding 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 1.00
12 Partner VC Funding 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 1.00
13 Dyad VC Investment Stage 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.19 1.00
14 Firm VC Bioinvestment Experience 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.01 0.54 0.01 -0.02 1.00
15 Partner VC Bioinvestment Experience 0.01 0.16 0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.59 -0.09 0.00 1.00
16 Firm Citations 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.07 -0.08 0.00 1.00
17 Partner Citations 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1.00
18 Firm Alliance Experience 0.00 -0.02 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02 0.26 -0.01 1.00
19 Partner Alliance Experience 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.27 -0.10 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.00 -0.02 1.00
20 Firm Exploitative Experience 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
21 Partner Exploitative Experience -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
22 Firm Age 0.00 -0.04 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.14 -0.12 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00
23 Partner Age 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.21 -0.19 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.31 -0.06 0.26 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
Mean 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.04 6.48 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.11 0.44 3.21 2.93 0.15 0.11 1.58 0.72 0.03 0.11 7.82 7.71
S.D. 0.03 0.19 0.22 0.05 0.05 1.12 0.46 1.72 0.40 0.46 0.75 0.97 0.50 1.20 1.18 1.08 1.10 1.12 0.76 0.16 0.32 0.85 0.82
52 
 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Estimates for the Likelihood of R&D Alliance Formationa 
Variables 1 2 
Constant -5.899* -6.125* 
 (2.538) (2.562) 
Year, Therapeutic, Firm and Partner Industry Subgroup, and Firm 
and Partner Patent Class Fixed Effects 
Incl. Incl. 
Partner Age -0.487* -0.460† 
 (0.240) (0.242) 
Firm Age 0.089 0.115 
 (0.180) (0.182) 
Partner Exploitative Experience -4.061*** -4.059*** 
 (1.189) (1.202) 
Firm Exploitative Experience -1.405* -1.493* 
 (0.677) (0.686) 
Partner Alliance Experience 1.258*** 1.256*** 
 (0.184) (0.185) 
Firm Alliance Experience 0.013 0.003 
 (0.115) (0.116) 
Partner Citations 0.245† 0.260† 
 (0.134) (0.135) 
Firm Citations 0.009 0.021 
 (0.108) (0.109) 
Partner VC Bioinvestment Experience 0.093 0.043 
 (0.134) (0.132) 
Firm VC Bioinvestment Experience 0.051 0.007 
 (0.125) (0.128) 
Dyad VC Investment Stage -0.400 -0.390 
 (0.258) (0.258) 
Partner VC Funding -0.385* -0.399** 
 (0.152) (0.153) 
Firm VC Funding -0.157 -0.187 
 (0.147) (0.150) 
Partner VC Prominence 0.308 0.302 
 (0.237) (0.238) 
Firm VC Prominence 0.401* 0.381* 
 (0.182) (0.186) 
Distance -0.123* -0.116* 
 (0.052) (0.051) 
Partner Product Development 0.336*** 0.340*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) 
Firm Product Development 0.039 0.053 
 (0.068) (0.068) 
Partner Specific Experience 1.575*** 1.630*** 
 (0.395) (0.413) 
Cross Citations 1.667*** 1.698*** 
 (0.347) (0.348) 
Technology Relatedness 0.860* 0.844* 
 (0.417) (0.420) 
Common VC  1.145*** 
  (0.342) 
Log likelihood -505.78 -502.03 
χ2 707.32*** 746.65*** 
aN=87562. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10. 
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Table 3: Estimates for Interaction Effectsa 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant -6.200* -6.126* -6.186* -6.128* -6.068* -6.161* 
 (2.567) (2.560) (2.565) (2.561) (2.577) (2.580) 
Year, Therapeutic, Firm and Partner 
Industry Subgroup, and Firm and 
Partner Patent Class Fixed Effects 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
Partner Age -0.451† -0.462† -0.459† -0.459† -0.455† -0.450† 
 (0.243) (0.242) (0.243) (0.242) (0.242) (0.245) 
Firm Age 0.114 0.117 0.120 0.115 0.110 0.116 
 (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182) 
Partner Exploitative Experience -4.076*** 
(1.193) 
-4.060*** 
(1.203) 
-4.060*** 
(1.204) 
-4.054*** 
(1.202) 
-4.063*** 
(1.206) 
-4.075*** 
(1.199) 
Firm Exploitative Experience -1.487* -1.495* -1.489* -1.489* -1.484* -1.470* 
 (0.684) (0.685) (0.687) (0.685) (0.680) (0.679) 
Partner Alliance Experience 1.260*** 1.258*** 1.258*** 1.256*** 1.253*** 1.255*** 
 (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.185) (0.184) (0.184) 
Firm Alliance Experience 0.012 -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114) (0.116) 
Partner Citations 0.257† 0.261† 0.258† 0.259† 0.262† 0.259† 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.136) (0.137) 
Firm Citations 0.023 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.026 0.027 
 (0.110) (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) 
Partner VC Bioinvestment 
Experience 
0.046 
(0.132) 
0.044 
(0.132) 
0.044 
(0.132) 
0.043 
(0.132) 
0.036 
(0.132) 
0.037 
(0.133) 
Firm VC Bioinvestment Experience 0.007 
(0.127) 
0.007 
(0.128) 
0.008 
(0.128) 
0.007 
(0.128) 
-0.009 
(0.128) 
-0.010 
(0.128) 
Dyad VC Investment Stage -0.393 -0.389 -0.389 -0.391 -0.394 -0.392 
 (0.257) (0.258) (0.259) (0.258) (0.257) (0.258) 
Partner VC Funding -0.401** -0.399** -0.401** -0.398** -0.401** -0.404** 
 (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.154) (0.155) 
Firm VC Funding -0.186 -0.187 -0.186 -0.186 -0.174 -0.169 
 (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Partner VC Prominence 0.300 0.301 0.304 0.301 0.288 0.286 
 (0.239) (0.238) (0.237) (0.238) (0.239) (0.239) 
Firm VC Prominence 0.379* 0.374* 0.386* 0.381* 0.372* 0.371* 
 (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.186) (0.187) (0.185) 
Distance -0.117* -0.116* -0.116* -0.116* -0.120* -0.121* 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Partner Product Development 0.361*** 0.340*** 0.343*** 0.340*** 0.336*** 0.361*** 
 (0.076) (0.079) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) 
Firm Product Development 0.057 0.060 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.059 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) 
Partner Specific Experience 1.644*** 1.631*** 1.669*** 1.631*** 1.606*** 1.656*** 
 (0.415) (0.414) (0.424) (0.413) (0.405) (0.417) 
Cross Citations 1.695*** 1.698*** 1.700*** 1.709*** 1.667*** 1.672*** 
 (0.348) (0.348) (0.348) (0.351) (0.348) (0.348) 
Technology Relatedness 0.843* 0.850* 0.835* 0.847* 1.101** 1.099** 
 (0.421) (0.419) (0.423) (0.419) (0.409) (0.410) 
Common VC 1.012** 0.807* 1.130*** 0.931** 1.321*** 0.558† 
 (0.335) (0.338) (0.341) (0.340) (0.348) (0.333) 
Common VC*Partner Product 
Development 
-2.380*** 
(0.182) 
    -2.624*** 
(0.185) 
Common VC*Firm Product 
Development 
 -2.593*** 
(0.220) 
   -2.728*** 
(0.272) 
Common VC*Partner Specific 
Experience 
  -0.884*** 
(0.078) 
  -1.090*** 
(0.097) 
Common VC*Cross Citations    -2.232***  -2.165*** 
    (0.234)  (0.225) 
Common VC*Technology 
Relatedness 
    -1.554*** 
(0.465) 
-1.512*** 
(0.460) 
Log likelihood -501.46 -501.86 -501.68 -501.97 -500.26 -499.33 
χ2 1683.11*** 1317.18*** 1451.02*** 804.53*** 783.93*** 3612.95*** 
aN=87562. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10. 
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Table 4: Logistic Regression Estimation Results for Matched Samplea 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant -6.263* -6.266* -6.405* -6.419* -6.247* -6.247* -6.374* 
 (2.484) (2.479) (2.788) (2.788) (2.474) (2.474) (2.481) 
Year, Therapeutic, Firm and 
Partner Industry Subgroup, 
and Firm and Partner Patent 
Class Fixed Effects 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
 
Incl. 
Partner Age -0.100 -0.097 -0.100 -0.100 -0.099 -0.099 -0.073 
 (0.247) (0.245) (0.247) (0.246) (0.247) (0.247) (0.244) 
Firm Age 0.378 0.375 0.378 0.379 0.373 0.373 0.369 
 (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261) (0.261) (0.261) 
Partner Exploitative 
Experience 
-2.714*** 
(0.779) 
-2.737*** 
(0.795) 
-2.714*** 
(0.779) 
-2.668*** 
(0.778) 
-2.673*** 
(0.763) 
-2.673*** 
(0.763) 
-2.617*** 
(0.760) 
Firm Exploitative Experience 1.638 
(1.017) 
1.644 
(1.019) 
1.638 
(.017) 
1.633 
(1.012) 
1.643 
(1.013) 
1.643 
(1.013) 
1.678† 
(1.007) 
Partner Alliance Experience 0.829*** 
(0.194) 
0.819*** 
(0.195) 
0.829*** 
(0.194) 
0.830*** 
(0.194) 
0.830*** 
(0.194) 
0.830*** 
(0.194) 
0.823*** 
(0.195) 
Firm Alliance Experience -0.231 -0.224 -0.231 -0.232 -0.231 -0.231 -0.250 
 (0.197) (0.198) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.197) (0.198) 
Partner Citations 0.346† 0.345† 0.346† 0.347† 0.346† 0.346† 0.346† 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
Firm Citations -0.021 -0.026 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.016 
 (0.178) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) 
Partner VC Bioinvestment 
Experience 
0.009 
(0.143) 
0.009 
(0.143) 
0.009 
(0.143) 
0.010 
(0.143) 
0.010 
(0.143) 
0.010 
(0.143) 
0.016 
(0.143) 
Firm VC Bioinvestment 
Experience 
-0.140 
(0.159) 
-0.138 
(0.159) 
-0.140 
(0.159) 
-0.140 
(0.159) 
-0.140 
(0.159) 
-0.140 
(0.159) 
-0.164 
(0.159) 
Partner VC Funding -0.659*** -0.657*** -0.658*** -0.659*** -0.660*** -0.660*** -0.672*** 
 (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.165) 
Firm VC Funding -0.192 -0.194 -0.191 -0.191 -0.191 -0.191 -0.165 
 (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.181) 
Dyad VC Investment Stage -0.543† -0.536† -0.543† -0.544† -0.543† -0.543† -0.541† 
 (0.298) (0.296) (0.298) (0.297) (0.298) (0.298) (0.296) 
Distance 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Partner VC Prominence 0.699 0.689 0.699 0.696 0.702 0.702 0.658 
 (0.492) (0.498) (0.492) (0.491) (0.490) (0.490) (0.502) 
Firm VC Prominence 0.480* 0.483* 0.480* 0.479* 0.480* 0.480* 0.449† 
 (0.242) (0.243) (0.242) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) (0.241) 
Partner Product Development 0.700*** 
(0.150) 
0.743*** 
(0.169) 
0.700*** 
(0.150) 
0.698*** 
(0.151) 
0.696*** 
(0.150) 
0.696*** 
(0.150) 
0.717*** 
(0.169) 
Firm Product Development 0.354*** 0.356*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.355*** 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) 
Partner Specific Experience 2.625*** 
(0.752) 
2.620*** 
(0.753) 
2.625*** 
(0.752) 
2.639*** 
(0.760) 
2.623*** 
(0.750) 
2.623*** 
(0.750) 
2.611*** 
(0.760) 
Technology Relatedness 1.009* 1.014* 1.009* 1.008* 1.019* 1.019* 1.283** 
 (0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.499) (0.498) (0.498) (0.492) 
Cross Citations 1.867*** 1.870*** 1.867*** 1.866*** 1.886*** 1.886*** 1.826*** 
 (0.543) (0.544) (0.543) (0.543) (0.546) (0.546) (0.528) 
Common VC 1.113** 0.996* 1.113** 1.071** 0.927* 0.927* 0.873* 
 (0.411) (0.408) (0.411) (0.410) (0.407) (0.407) (0.432) 
Common VC*Partner Product 
Development 
 -1.720*** 
(0.193) 
    -1.669*** 
(0.224) 
Common VC*Firm Product 
Development 
  -2.049*** 
(0.197) 
   -2.006*** 
(0.198) 
Common VC*Partner Specific 
Experience 
   -0.838*** 
(0.122) 
  -0.787*** 
(0.126) 
Common VC*Cross Citations     -2.002*** 
(0.266) 
 -2.085*** 
(0.308) 
Common VC*Technology 
Relatedness 
     -0.986* 
(0.446) 
-0.944† 
(0.489) 
Log likelihood -279.87 -279.69 -279.75 -279.71 -279.81 -279.77 -278.27 
χ2 724.71*** 835.95*** 816.36*** 901.98*** 773.36*** 80.5.50*** 2777.70*** 
aN=2920. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.10. 
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